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ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
          This is an appeal from three orders dismissing all of 
the plaintiffs' claims in a consolidated class action securities 
fraud complaint.  The orders were based on Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 8, 9(b), and 12(b)(6).  We affirm in part, reverse in 
part, and remand for further proceedings. 
 
                                I. 
         A.  Plaintiffs in this case are all purchasers of 
publicly traded Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
("Westinghouse") securities.  Plaintiffs purchased Westinghouse 
common stock between March 28, 1989, and October 22, 1991 ("the 
class period"). 
         Defendants include Westinghouse, Westinghouse Financial 
Services, Inc. ("WFSI") (a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Westinghouse), Westinghouse Credit Corporation ("WCC") (which is 
owned by WFSI), and certain directors and senior officers of 
these companies (the "individual defendants").  (We will refer to 
the above defendants collectively as the "Westinghouse 
defendants.")  The other defendants are Price Waterhouse (the 
independent accountant for the Westinghouse companies), and a 
proposed defendant class of underwriters (the "underwriter 
defendants") involved in a May 1991 public offering of 
Westinghouse common stock. 
         B.  The relevant allegations of plaintiffs' complaint, 
which were set forth in detail by the district court, see In re 
Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 832 F. Supp. 948 (W.D. Pa. 
1993), may be summarized as follows.  During the 1980's, WCC grew 
rapidly by committing substantial funds to the financing of real 
estate developments and highly leveraged transactions.  In the 
late 1980's, however, WCC experienced an increase in defaults in 
its real estate loans and in delinquencies in other transactions.  
As a result, WCC suffered billions of dollars of losses, and the 
Westinghouse defendants feared a drop in WCC's commercial paper 
ratings.  To protect those ratings, they concealed the losses, 
which allegedly totalled between $2.6 and $5.3 billion, through 
improper accounting and reporting techniques.     
         Prior to February 1991, Westinghouse management decided 
that WCC needed a cash infusion if it was to maintain its 
commercial paper ratings.  Westinghouse developed a major 
restructuring plan, which it announced on February 27, 1991.  
Under that plan, Westinghouse decided to "downsize" WCC by 
selling or restructuring nearly one-third of its assets that had 
previously been held on a long-term basis.  Westinghouse knew 
that selling and restructuring so many non-performing or 
underperforming assets in the market that existed at the time 
would result in significant losses.  Westinghouse thus took a 
$975 million pre-tax charge against fourth quarter 1990 earnings 
to be applied to loan loss reserves and to cover estimated 
losses.  The press release and other documents issued by 
Westinghouse in connection with these actions stated that they 
decisively addressed WFSI's and WCC's problems.  Plaintiffs 
allege that these statements were materially false when made in 
that defendants knew (or recklessly disregarded facts 
demonstrating) that reserves remained inadequate as of that time.  
Plaintiffs point to a statement by James Focareta, WCC's 
president from early 1990 to early 1991, in which he acknowledged 
that the $975 million writeoff was known to be insufficient.  
Focareta said: "The number that was used ($975 million) was a 
number developed for something else . . . .  Every Westinghouse 
credit manager knew that was not sufficient . . . .  The Keystone 
Kops were involved, clearly."  App. 1134. 
         Plaintiffs assert that Westinghouse further compounded 
the harm to investors by raising $500 million through a May 1991 
stock offering.  Westinghouse offered 19 million shares of its 
common stock for sale to the investing public at $26.50 per share 
on May 9, 1991.  Plaintiffs allege that the Prospectus and 
Registration Statement filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC") in May 1991, as well as other documents 
(including the Annual Report) that were incorporated by reference 
therein, contained material misrepresentations and omissions. 
         In October 1991, Westinghouse determined and announced 
that the restructuring plan had to be accelerated.  Additional 
assets of $3.1 billion were designated as being held for sale or 
restructuring.  Westinghouse took a $1.68 billion pre-tax charge 
in anticipation of further losses it expected to suffer.  
Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew as early as October 1990 
that a charge of this magnitude was inevitable and that 
defendants' statements to the contrary over the course of that 
year and contemporaneous with the October 1991 announcement were 
materially false.  Plaintiffs claim that they paid artificially 
inflated prices of from $21.75 to $39.375 per share in contrast 
to Westinghouse's closing price of $15.875 after the announcement 
of the October 1991 charge. 
         C.  The first of the class action complaints 
consolidated herein was filed in February 1991, just after 
Westinghouse announced the restructuring plan.  In May 1991, the 
magistrate judge granted plaintiffs limited discovery to prepare 
a consolidated complaint.  In March 1992, the magistrate judge 
ordered that Westinghouse make available to plaintiffs documents 
related to over 500 active investment files.  Plaintiffs filed 
the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ("the first 
amended complaint") in June 1992. 
         The first amended complaint alleged violations of the 
following provisions:  sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C.  78j(b), 78t, 
and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.  240.10b-5, against all defendants 
(count I); sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 
("Securities Act"), 15 U.S.C.  77k, 77o, against all defendants 
(count II); section 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.  
77l(2), against all defendants except Price Waterhouse (count 
III); separate violations of sections 11 and 15 against all 
defendants except for the underwriter defendants (count IV); 
separate violations of section 12(2) against the Westinghouse 
defendants (count V); and negligent misrepresentation against all 
defendants (count VI). 
         In August 1992, defendants moved to dismiss all counts 
of the first amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6).  In an opinion and order entered on 
July 29, 1993, the district court granted defendants' motion.  
See In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 832 F. Supp. 948 
(W.D. Pa. 1993) (Westinghouse I).  Count I and a small piece of 
count VI were dismissed without prejudice to repleading, while 
counts II-V and most of count VI were dismissed with prejudice. 
         Plaintiffs filed the Second Consolidated Amended Class 
Action Complaint ("the second amended complaint") in September 
1993.  Plaintiffs repled all of their claims, including those 
that had been dismissed with prejudice (stating that such claims 
were being repled verbatim solely to preserve their appellate 
rights).  In December 1993, defendants moved to dismiss the 
second amended complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
8, 9(b), and 12(b)(6).  In March 1994, plaintiffs cross-moved to 
supplement the second amended complaint. 
         In January 1995, the district court granted defendants' 
motion to dismiss the second amended complaint.  See In re 
Westinghouse Securities Litigation, Civ. No. 91-354, Opinion and 
Order entered January 23, 1995, App. 310-46 (Westinghouse II).  
Counts II-VI were dismissed without discussion, since they had 
already been dismissed with prejudice in Westinghouse I.  Many of 
the claims in count I were dismissed with prejudice, and the 
remainder of the claims in count I were dismissed without 
prejudice to repleading in accordance with Rule 8.  The district 
court also denied as moot plaintiffs' motion to supplement the 
second amended complaint. 
         Plaintiffs filed a "Notice of Intention to Stand on 
Second Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint," in which 
they informed the district court that they would not be amending 
the complaint; rather, plaintiffs stated that they were going to 
"stand" on the complaint and seek immediate appellate review.  
App. 347.  The district court then dismissed plaintiffs' 
remaining claims from count I with prejudice and closed the case.  
See App. 350-51 (Memorandum Order entered March 1, 1995).  This 
appeal followed. 
         On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the district court 
improperly dismissed various of their section 10(b) claims under 
Rule 8; misapplied the "bespeaks caution" doctrine; improperly 
found that plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with particularity; 
mistakenly found that plaintiffs failed to plead materiality; and 
erroneously dismissed the section 12(2) claims.  Plaintiffs also 
argue that the district court should have granted their motion to 
supplement the second amended complaint.  Finally, plaintiffs 
argue that this case should be assigned to a new district judge. 
          
                               II. 
         A.  We turn first to plaintiffs' challenge to the 
district court's Rule 8 dismissal.  Rule 8(a) provides that any 
pleading that includes a claim for relief shall contain "a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  Rule 8(e) further 
provides that "[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, 
concise, and direct."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).  "Taken together, 
Rules 8(a) and 8(e)(1) underscore the emphasis placed on clarity 
and brevity by the federal pleading rules."  5 Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure  1217 at 169 (2d ed. 1990). 
         We review the district court's decision to dismiss 
claims under Rule 8 for an abuse of discretion.  E.g., Kuehl v. 
F.D.I.C., 8 F.3d 905, 908 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 1545 (1994); 5 Wright & Miller,  1217 at 175.  "It is well 
settled that the question on review `is not whether we would have 
imposed a more lenient penalty had we been sitting in the trial 
judge's place, but whether the trial judge abused his discretion 
in imposing the penalty he did.'"  Kuehl v. F.D.I.C., 8 F.3d at 
908-09 (citation omitted). 
         The district court's January 1995 opinion and order 
provided that "with respect to those aspects of Count One that 
survive the instant Opinion and Order, plaintiffs are granted 30 
days from this date within which to replead in conformity with 
the requirements of Rule 8."  Westinghouse II, Op. at 21, App. 
330; Order at 35, App. 344.  The district court added that 
"[f]ailure to comply with this Order will result in the dismissal 
of plaintiffs' claims with prejudice."  Id. 
         On February 21, 1995, plaintiffs filed a "Notice of 
Intention to Stand on Second Consolidated Amended Class Action 
Complaint."  Plaintiffs stated as follows: 
              Plaintiffs have carefully weighed the 
         merits of repleading against seeking 
         immediate appellate review.  They 
         respectfully give notice of their intention 
         to stand on the Complaint.  See, Shapiro v. 
         UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 
         1992). 
App. 348.  The district court then dismissed with prejudice all 
of plaintiffs' remaining claims, stating as follows: 
              On January 20, 1995, this Court 
         dismissed plaintiffs' Second Amended Class 
         Action Complaint.  As that Opinion and Order 
         explained, with respect to those aspects of 
         Count One of plaintiffs' Second Amended 
         Complaint that survived the January 20, 1995 
         Opinion and Order, plaintiffs were granted 30 
         days from that date within which to replead 
         in conformity with the requirements of Rule 8 
         of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  The 
         Opinion and Order specifically stated that 
         failure to replead within 30 days would 
         result in the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims 
         with prejudice. 
               
              Instead of filing an amended complaint, 
         plaintiffs filed a Notice of Intention to 
         Stand on Second Consolidated Amended Class 
         Action Complaint, indicating that they had 
         "carefully weighed the merits of repleading 
         against seeking immediate appellate review." 
               
              Accordingly, . . . it is hereby ORDERED 
         that all remaining claims in plaintiffs' 
         Second Amended Class Action Complaint are 
         dismissed with prejudice. 
App. 350-51 (Memorandum Order entered 3/1/95). 
         B.  Plaintiffs argue first that the Rule 8 dismissal 
without prejudice in Westinghouse II should be reversed because 
the district court imposed inconsistent pleading standards on 
them.  Plaintiffs contend that the Westinghouse I opinion 
required them to draft the second amended complaint with 
tremendous specificity.  They argue that the district court in 
effect required that they violate Rule 8 (if they violated Rule 8 
at all) in order to comply with Rule 9(b).  See Plfs' Br. at 44- 
46.  We disagree. 
         It is well settled that "the particularity demands of 
pleading fraud under Rule 9(b) in no way negate the commands of 
Rule 8."  Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc., 20 
F.3d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted); see generally5 Wright & 
Miller,  1281 at 520-21 (pleading fraud with 
particularity under Rule 9(b) should be done consistently with 
the general philosophy of Rule 8); 2A Moore's Federal Practice  
8.13, at 8-58 (2d ed. 1995) (the requirements of Rule 8 apply 
"even where the Rules command particularity, as in the pleading 
of fraud under Rule 9(b)") (footnote omitted). 
         Having reviewed plaintiffs' second amended complaint, 
we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in 
dismissing the viable portion of count I, without prejudice to 
repleading, pursuant to Rule 8.  The second amended complaint is 
unnecessarily complicated and verbose.  The text of the complaint 
rambles for more than 600 paragraphs and 240 pages, including a 
50-plus page "overview" of the alleged wrongful conduct.  The 
district court, through the two rounds of difficult motions, had 
narrowed plaintiffs' claims.  The court then ordered plaintiffs 
to submit a third amended complaint containing only those 
allegations relevant to what were, in the court's view, the 
remaining viable claims.  This does not seem to us to constitute 
an abuse of discretion; indeed, it makes a tremendous amount of 
sense.  See generally In re Glenfed, Inc. Securities Litigation, 
42 F.3d 1541, 1544 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("We see nothing to 
prevent the district court, on remand, from requiring, as a 
matter of prudent case management, that plaintiffs streamline and 
reorganize the complaint before allowing it to serve as the 
document controlling discovery, or, indeed, before requiring 
defendants to file an answer."). 
         C.  We further hold that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the 
otherwise viable claims from count I following plaintiffs' 
decision not to replead those claims in accordance with Rule 8.  
The district court expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to 
replead the remaining claims in compliance with Rule 8 would 
result in the dismissal of those claims.  The dismissal with 
prejudice that followed plaintiffs' decision not to amend was not 
an abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., 5 Wright & Miller,  1217 at 
178 (dismissal with prejudice appropriate where party refuses to 
file an amended and simplified pleading).  As we recently stated 
in a different but analogous context, "it is difficult to 
conceive of what other course the court could have followed."  
Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 455 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming 
dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff refused to go forward 
with remaining claims). 
         D.  Defendants attempt to go further.  They argue that 
all of plaintiffs' claims -- including those that had been 
dismissed with prejudice under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6) in 
Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II -- were also dismissed with 
prejudice on Rule 8 grounds and that this dismissal was proper.  
Thus, according to defendants, 
         [e]ven if this Court were to reverse any 
         portion of the District Court's ruling 
         dismissing portions of [the second amended 
         complaint] with prejudice on grounds other 
         than Rule 8, plaintiffs still would be bound 
         by their irrevocable election to stand on 
         their Second Amended Complaint, which still 
         will constitute "a flagrant violation of the 
         requirements of Rule 8." 
West. Br. at 20 (quoting Westinghouse II, Op. at 20, App. 329).  
There is slim support for defendants' argument in Westinghouse 
II, where the court stated that "plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Complaint shall be dismissed in its entirety for failure to plead 
in conformity with the requirements of Rule 8."  Op. at 21, App. 
330.  On the whole, however, we do not agree with defendants' 
characterization of what the district court did.  As we 
understand the record, the district court, having already 
dismissed certain claims with prejudice on non-Rule 8 grounds in 
Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II, did not later dismiss those 
claims again for failure to comply with Rule 8.     
         First, we note that the district court specifically 
ordered plaintiffs not to include in the third amended complaint 
any claims except for those that survived Westinghouse II.  
Westinghouse II, Op. at 21, App. 330; Order at 35, App. 344.  
Thus, even if plaintiffs had repled and filed a third amended 
complaint, the claims that had been dismissed on grounds other 
than Rule 8 could not have been included.  Because plaintiffs 
were permitted to replead only those claims that survived 
Westinghouse II, it seems implausible to suggest that their 
decision not to replead could have had any effect on any claims 
other than those that the district court sustained in 
Westinghouse II. 
         Second, the district court's Memorandum Order of March 
1, 1995, is the only order in the record that dismisses any claim 
or claims with prejudice under Rule 8, and that order quite 
clearly applies to only those claims that had survived dismissal 
with prejudice on other grounds in Westinghouse I and 
Westinghouse II.  That order explicitly states that "it is hereby 
ORDERED that all remaining claims in plaintiffs' Second Amended 
Class Action Complaint are dismissed with prejudice."  App. 350- 
51 (emphasis added).  Thus, we reject defendants' argument that 
either Westinghouse II or the court's March 1, 1995 Memorandum 
Order dismissed any claims with prejudice under Rule 8 that had 
already been dismissed on their merits. 
         E.  Defendants next argue that if we do not hold that 
all of the plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed under Rule 
8, we should nevertheless decline to review the dismissal of 
claims in Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II on non-Rule 8 
grounds.  Defendants contend that "interlocutory orders -- such 
as the District Court's July 1993 and January 1995 Orders, which 
contain all of the District Court's non-Rule 8 rulings appealed 
by plaintiffs -- do not merge into and are not encompassed by 
final orders where plaintiffs engage in a strategy intended to 
create an avenue for this Court to reach issues not subject to 
interlocutory appeals."  West. Br. at 21 (emphasis in original).  
Defendants rely on Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 
1974) (affirming dismissal for lack of prosecution and choosing 
not to reach underlying substantive issue decided in prior 
interlocutory order) and Sullivan v. Pacific Indem. Co., 566 F.2d 
444 (3d Cir. 1977) (dismissing for lack of an appealable order 
where appellant did not challenge dismissal for failure to 
prosecute but attempted to appeal prior interlocutory order 
denying motion for class certification).  Plaintiffs counter that 
they followed the procedure expressly approved by this court in 
Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d at 278-79 ("a plaintiff 
can convert a dismissal with leave to amend into a final order by 
electing to stand upon the original complaint") (citing Borelli 
v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976)).  SeePlfs' Rep. 
Br. at 8.  We find the defendants' argument 
unpersuasive. 
         First, we reject the suggestion (see Westinghouse Br. 
at 20) that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court's 
rulings in Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II.  "The principle is 
well-settled in this circuit that an order dismissing a complaint 
without prejudice is not a final and appealable order, unless the 
plaintiff no longer can amend the complaint because, for example, 
the statute of limitations has run, or the plaintiff has elected 
to stand on the complaint."  Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. 
Harrison, 907 F.2d 1408, 1416-17 (3d Cir. 1990) (citations and 
footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also Bethel v. 
McAllister Brothers, Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 668 (3d Cir. 1991); Trevino-Barton 
v. Pittsburgh National Bank, 919 F.2d 874, 877-78 (3d Cir. 1990).  
In UJB, the plaintiffs stood on their complaint with respect to 
claims that had been dismissed without prejudice under Rule 9(b).  
They argued that their allegations satisfied Rule 9(b) and that 
they were not required to make any further amendments.  This 
court concluded that it had jurisdiction to consider the merits 
of the Rule 9(b) dismissal and explained: 
         [W]e have held that a plaintiff can convert a 
         dismissal with leave to amend into a final 
         order by electing to stand upon the original 
         complaint.  See, e.g., Borelli v. City of 
         Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976) 
         ("Only if the plaintiff . . . declares his 
         intention to stand on his complaint . . . the 
         order becomes final and appealable").  
         Plaintiffs here stood on their complaint, but 
         defendants contend that this was not enough.  
         They maintain that we lack jurisdiction 
         because plaintiffs failed to obtain an 
         explicit dismissal with prejudice.  We do not 
         agree. 
964 F.2d at 278 (alterations in UJB).  The court thus considered 
whether plaintiffs' allegations that had been dismissed without 
prejudice actually satisfied Rule 9(b). 
         Here, when plaintiffs elected to stand on the second 
amended complaint rather than replead the remaining claims in 
compliance with Rule 8, the remaining claims were dismissed with 
prejudice, and the case was closed in the district court.  Under 
the authorities discussed above, there is no doubt that the 
district court's dismissal of the case with prejudice was a 
reviewable, final order.  We therefore reject the defendants' 
contentions to the extent that they challenge our appellate 
jurisdiction. 
         Furthermore, we see no prudential grounds for declining 
to review the merits of the district court's dismissal of claims 
on non-Rule 8 grounds in Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II.  
Under the "merger rule," prior interlocutory orders merge with 
the final judgment in a case, and the interlocutory orders (to 
the extent that they affect the final judgment) may be reviewed 
on appeal from the final order.  See, e.g., Silver v. Mendel, 894 
F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990); 
Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1253 (3d 
Cir. 1977) ("the appeal from a final judgment draws in question 
all prior non-final orders and rulings which produced the 
judgment") (citation omitted).  Under this rule, the district 
court's orders in Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II merged with 
the final order dismissing the remaining claims with prejudice 
and closing the case and thus would ordinarily be subject to 
review on appeal from the final order.  
         Defendants, however, invoke an exception to the merger 
rule pursuant to which courts decline to reach prior 
interlocutory rulings where to do so would undermine the policy 
against piecemeal appeals.  See generally, e.g., Sere v. Board of 
Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 852 F.2d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1988) 
("Although the general rule is that rulings on interlocutory 
orders are encompassed within a subsequent final judgment and may 
be reviewed as part of that judgment, the rule is inapplicable 
where adherence would reward a party for dilatory and bad faith 
tactics.") (citations omitted).  The line of cases relied upon by 
defendants stands for the proposition that a dismissal with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute frequently bars review of 
previously entered interlocutory orders.  Without addressing the 
potential scope of this exception to the merger rule, see Fassett 
v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (New York), 807 F.2d 1150, 1155 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (dictum declining to extend Sullivan holding beyond 
class certification context), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070 (1987), 
we conclude that the exception has no application here.  The 
failure-to-prosecute cases upon which defendants rely are 
distinguishable from plaintiffs' decision in this case to stand 
on the second amended complaint -- a decision that we regard as 
squarely governed by our holding in UJB.  We are confident that 
our review of the merits of the orders in Westinghouse I and 
Westinghouse II will not "invite the inundation of appellate 
dockets with requests for review of interlocutory orders [or] 
undermine the ability of trial judges to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases."  Cf. Marshall v. Sielaff, 492 
F.2d at 919. 
         To summarize our holdings thus far, we have concluded 
that the district court did not err in dismissing with prejudice 
under Rule 8 those claims that were not dismissed with prejudice 
on other grounds in Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II; that the 
claims that were dismissed with prejudice in Westinghouse I and 
Westinghouse II on non-Rule 8 grounds were not later dismissed 
with prejudice under Rule 8 as well; and that it is 
jurisdictionally proper and appropriate for us to consider 
whether the district court erred in dismissing these claims 
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) in 
Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II.   
         We exercise plenary review over these dismissals.  See, 
e.g., UJB, 964 F.2d at 279.  Moreover, we must accept as true 
plaintiffs' factual allegations, and we may affirm the district 
court's dismissals only if it appears certain that plaintiffs can 
prove no set of facts entitling them to relief.  Id. at 279-80 
(citation omitted). 
         In ruling on the two rounds of motions, the district 
court considered various undisputedly authentic documents 
attached to plaintiffs' complaint or defendants' motions to 
dismiss.  Because plaintiffs' claims are based upon these 
documents, they were properly considered as part of defendants' 
motions to dismiss.  E.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino 
Securities Litigation, 7 F.3d 357, 368 n.9 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.denied, 
114 S. Ct. 1219 (1994) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 687 (1994)). 
 
                               III. 
         Plaintiffs' claims under section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act and under sections 11 and 12(2) of the Securities Act all 
require, among other things, that plaintiffs allege a materialmisstatement 
or omission.  See Trump, 7 F.3d at 368 n.10.  
Defendants argued in the district court that any misstatements 
they may have made with respect to the adequacy of WCC's loan 
loss reserves were not material.  Defendants contended, under the 
"bespeaks caution" doctrine, that their cautionary language 
regarding the adequacy of WCC's loan loss reserves rendered 
immaterial any alleged misrepresentations.  The district court 
largely accepted this argument.  In Westinghouse I, the court 
dismissed most of the allegations regarding loan loss reserves 
contained in the first amended complaint, see 832 F. Supp. at 
973-77, 985-86, and in Westinghouse II, the court clarified that 
no cautionary language immunized defendants' alleged 
misstatements occurring prior to February 27, 1991.  Thus, under 
the two opinions and orders, the allegations regarding alleged 
misstatements about loan loss reserves that were made on or after 
February 27, 1991, were dismissed under the "bespeaks caution" 
doctrine.  We now turn to plaintiffs' challenge to this 
dismissal. 
         As we explained in Trump, "`bespeaks caution' is 
essentially shorthand for the well-established principle that a 
statement or omission must be considered in context, so that 
accompanying statements may render it immaterial as a matter of 
law."  7 F.3d at 364.  We described the doctrine as follows: 
              The application of bespeaks caution 
         depends on the specific text of the offering 
         document or other communication at issue, 
         i.e., courts must assess the communication on 
         a case-by-case basis.  Nevertheless, we can 
         state as a general matter that, when an 
         offering document's forecasts, opinions or 
         projections are accompanied by meaningful 
         cautionary statements, the forward-looking 
         statements will not form the basis for a 
         securities fraud claim if those statements 
         did not affect the "total mix" of information 
         the document provided investors.  In other 
         words, cautionary language, if sufficient, 
         renders the alleged omissions or 
         misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of 
         law. 
          
              . . . Of course, a vague or blanket 
         (boilerplate) disclaimer which merely warns 
         the reader that the investment has risks will 
         ordinarily be inadequate to prevent 
         misinformation.  To suffice, the cautionary 
         statements must be substantive and tailored 
         to the specific future projections, estimates 
         or opinions in the prospectus which the 
         plaintiffs challenge. 
               
              . . . [T]he prospectus here truly 
         bespeaks caution because, not only does the 
         prospectus generally convey the riskiness of 
         the investment, but its warnings and 
         cautionary language directly address the 
         substance of the statement the plaintiffs 
         challenge. 
7 F.3d at 371-72 (citation omitted); see also Kline v. First 
Western Government Securities, Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 489 (3d Cir.) 
("Trump requires that the language bespeaking caution relate 
directly to that by which plaintiffs claim to have been misled.") 
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 613 (1994).  In 
Trump, we concluded that given the "extensive yet specific 
cautionary language, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude" 
that the alleged misrepresentation "would influence a reasonable 
investor's investment decision."  Trump, 7 F.3d at 369; see alsoid. at 373 
("no reasonable jury could conclude that the subject 
projection materially influenced a reasonable investor"). 
         Plaintiffs' loan loss reserves claims under sections 11 
and 12(2) are based solely on alleged misstatements in 
Westinghouse's May 1991 Registration Statement and Prospectus and 
documents incorporated therein.  The reserves claims under 
section 10(b) are based upon those documents as well as other 
alleged misstatements addressing the adequacy of the loan loss 
reserves.  The essence of plaintiffs' allegations is that 
defendants knowingly or recklessly misrepresented (i) the 
adequacy of WCC's loan loss reserves and (ii) compliance with 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") in establishing 
the reserves. 
         With regard to plaintiffs' section 10(b) claims, the 
district court concluded that the warnings, "far from being 
Pollyanish, pointed to still darker clouds on the horizon if the 
economy generally, and real estate markets specifically, did not 
improve. . . .  Accordingly, despite sufficient allegations of 
scienter and materiality, defendants' alleged misrepresentations 
about the adequacy of Westinghouse and WCC loan loss reserves 
were so strongly qualified by clear warnings about the future 
that plaintiffs' causes of action . . . must be dismissed under 
the `bespeaks caution' doctrine."  832 F. Supp. at 976.  The 
court reached a similar conclusion with regard to plaintiffs' 
claims under sections 11 and 12(2).  See id. at 985-86 (finding 
that Westinghouse's prospectus "`virtually bristles with 
warnings'" and that its statements regarding the adequacy of its 
reserves were "remarkably equivocal") (citation omitted). 
         Defendants contend that all of the above claims were 
properly dismissed because any alleged misstatements are 
immaterial when considered in the context of cautionary language 
contained in various filings with the SEC.  See Westinghouse I, 
832 F. Supp. at 974-76 (summarizing non-prospectus warnings and 
quoting from numerous Westinghouse filings).  In defense of the 
district court's decision, Westinghouse's brief highlights the 
following excerpts from the May 1991 Registration Statement and 
Prospectus, which typify the warnings on which the defendants 
rely: 
         As part of the reclassification of the $3.4 
         billion of assets, the Company reclassified 
         for sale approximately $654 million of 
         marketable securities. . . .  This portfolio 
         will be liquidated as soon as practicable; 
         however, future deterioration in market value 
         could result in additional losses prior to 
         sale . . . . 
 
         The $3.4 billion in higher-risk and 
         underperforming assets reclassified as held 
         for sale or restructuring included $2.4 
         billion in receivables.  As such, these 
         receivables had and continue to have a high 
         probability of becoming non-earning assetsduring the expected 
period of liquidation . . 
         . . 
 
         Of the $2.4 billion of receivables held for 
         sale or restructuring, at March 31, 1991, 
         approximately $700 million were non-earning, 
         up from $481 million at December 31, 1990. . 
         . .  Real estate owned in assets held for 
         sale or restructuring was approximately $335 
         million at March 31, 1991, up from $285 
         million at December 31, 1990. 
 
         Of the remaining $8.0 billion in receivables 
         in WFSI's ongoing portfolio, non-earning 
         receivables totaled approximately $180 
         million at March 31, 1991, up from $71 
         million at December 31, 1990.  Reduced 
         earning receivables totaled approximately 
         $725 million at March 31, 1991, up from $605 
         million at December 31, 1990.  Real estate 
         owned was approximately $175 million at March 
         31, 1991, up from $85 million at December 31, 
         1990. 
 
         At March 31, 1991, WFSI's valuation 
         allowances related to assets held for sale or 
         restructuring, and the allowances for credit 
         losses related to the assets in the ongoing 
         portfolio, amounted to $1.013 million and 
         $306 million, respectively.  Management 
         believes that under current economic 
         conditions such allowances should be adequate 
         to cover future losses that may occur.  
         However, a further or more prolonged downturn 
         in the economy or in the real estate, 
         securities or certain other markets could 
         have a negative effect on the ability of 
         WFSI's borrowers to repay and on asset values 
         generally and could result in additional 
         increases in non-earnings assets, 
         restructured loans and, ultimately, increases 
         in allowances for losses in both assets held 
         for sale or restructuring and receivables in 
         the balance of WFSI's portfolio. 
 
Westinghouse Br. at 29-30 (quoting App. 748-49) (emphasis and 
ellipses in Westinghouse brief).  
         Plaintiffs argue that this and other similar cautionary 
language was insufficient because it implied, consistently with 
the alleged misstatements by Westinghouse officials, that 
defendants believed, as of February 1991 and thereafter, that the 
loan loss reserves were and would remain adequate "under current 
economic conditions."  Plaintiffs contend that defendants' 
statements regarding the adequacy of the loan loss reserves were 
materially false when made because defendants knew that the 
reserves were and would remain inadequate, even without any 
future or prolonged economic downturn.  Plaintiffs allege that 
Westinghouse management and other defendants knew that the 
February 1991 charge was inadequate to cover current and expected 
future losses.  Plaintiffs assert that defendants knew that WCC's 
loan portfolio was overstated by between $2.6 billion and $5.3 
billion immediately prior to the first writedown of $975 million 
in February 1991.  Pointing to internal documents suggesting that 
Westinghouse believed that the $975 million charge was "credible" 
and "affordable," plaintiffs argue that defendants should have 
been concerned with whether the charge complied with GAAP.  
Plaintiffs also point to the statement by former WCC President 
James Focareta, in which he allegedly acknowledged that 
Westinghouse officials knew in February 1991 that the $975 
million charge was insufficient.  See  App. 1134. 
         Having carefully reviewed the cautionary language on 
which the defendants and the district court relied, we find that 
these statements do not sufficiently counter the alleged 
misrepresentations, i.e., that the defendants knowingly or 
recklessly misrepresented the adequacy of the loan loss reserves 
and compliance with GAAP.  If, as plaintiffs say, defendants 
knowingly or recklessly misrepresented the adequacy of the loss 
reserves to protect against known losses and known risks in light 
of the then-current economic conditions, it follows that 
defendants' cautionary statements about the future did not render 
those misrepresentations immaterial.  In our view, a reasonable 
investor would be very interested in knowing, not merely that 
future economic developments might cause further losses, but that 
(as plaintiffs allege) current reserves were known to be 
insufficient under current economic conditions.  A reasonable 
investor might well be willing to take some chances with regard 
to the future of the economy, but might be quite unwilling to 
invest in a company that knew that its reserves were insufficient 
under current conditions and knew it would be taking another 
major write-down in the near future (as plaintiffs allege).  
Thus, notwithstanding the cautionary language stressed by 
defendants, we think that there is a substantial likelihood that 
defendants' alleged misrepresentations -- i.e., that the loan 
loss reserves were established in compliance with GAAP and were 
believed to be adequate to cover expected future losses given the 
then-existing economic conditions -- would have assumed actual 
significance to a reasonable investor contemplating the purchase 
of securities.  We therefore cannot say that the cautionary 
language rendered the alleged misrepresentations immaterial as a 
matter of law.  See Kline, 24 F.3d at 489 (rejecting bespeaks 
caution argument where purported cautionary language did not 
sufficiently counter alleged misstatements and omissions); seealso Fecht 
v. The Price Company, 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 
1995) ("Inclusion of some cautionary language is not enough to 
support a determination as a matter of law that defendants' 
statements were not misleading.") (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1422 (1996); 
Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 171 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(reiterating view that "`[t]o warn that the untoward may occur 
when the event is contingent is prudent; to caution that it is 
only possible for the unfavorable events to happen when they have 
already occurred is deceit'") (footnote omitted).  In short, we 
cannot conclude that the alleged misrepresentations would have 
been "so obviously unimportant to an investor that reasonable 
minds cannot differ on the question of materiality."  UJB, 964 
F.2d at 281 n.11 (citation omitted).  Dismissal of the loan loss 
reserves claims for the period after February 27, 1991 was thus 
improper, and we reverse this aspect of the orders entered in 
Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II. 
 
                               IV. 
         Plaintiffs next challenge the district court's 
dismissal of various other portions of their section 10(b) 
claims.  To state a securities fraud claim under section 10(b) 
and rule 10b-5, a private plaintiff must plead the following 
elements:  (1) that the defendant made a misrepresentation or 
omission of (2) a material (3) fact; (4) that the defendant acted 
with knowledge or recklessness and (5) that the plaintiff 
reasonably relied on the misrepresentation or omission and (6) 
consequently suffered damage.  E.g., UJB, 964 F.2d at 280.  Also, 
because section 10(b) claims sound in fraud, the circumstances 
constituting the fraud must be stated with particularity.  Seeid. at 284; 
In re Craftmatic Securities Litigation, 890 F.2d 628, 
645 (3d Cir. 1989); Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  "Rule 9(b) requires a 
plaintiff to plead (1) a specific false representation of 
material fact; (2) knowledge by the person who made it of its 
falsity; (3) ignorance of its falsity by the person to whom it 
was made; (4) the intention that it should be acted upon; and (5) 
that the plaintiff acted upon it to his damage."  UJB, 964 F.2d 
at 284 (citing Christidis v. First Pennsylvania Mortgage Trust, 
717 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
         Plaintiffs argue first that the district court 
improperly dismissed the section 10(b) claims against the 
Westinghouse defendants relating to Westinghouse's alleged 
concealment of nonearning receivables and inadequate internal 
controls.  Plaintiffs further contend that the district court 
erred in dismissing the section 10(b) claim against Price 
Waterhouse.  Plaintiffs also challenge the district court's 
dismissal of their claim that one of the underwriter defendants 
intentionally misled the public in the May 1991 offering.  We 
will consider each of plaintiffs' arguments. 
         A.  Nonearning receivables, also known as nonaccrual 
loans or nonearning loans, are defined as "[l]oans on which 
accrual of interest has been suspended because collectibility is 
doubtful."  American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
("AICPA"), Audits of Finance Companies 108 (1994); see alsoAmerican 
Bankers Association, Banking Terminology 244 (3d ed. 
1989) (defining nonearning asset as "[a]n asset that does not 
produce income, such as . . .  required reserves, or a nonaccrual 
loan").  Plaintiffs allege that Westinghouse manipulated its 
nonearning receivables accounts to overstate the quality of its 
receivables portfolio. 
         The district court essentially found that plaintiffs 
had not pled facts explaining with particularity how 
Westinghouse's statements concerning nonearning receivables were 
false and misleading or violated GAAP.  The district court thus 
dismissed these allegations under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) as 
"conclusory rather than factual."  832 F. Supp. at 967-68; seealso 
Westinghouse II, Op. at 4-6, App. 313-15.  The court found 
that plaintiffs, with the benefit of hindsight, were merely 
challenging Westinghouse's judgment as to when collectibility on 
the loans became doubtful.  Id.  We disagree. 
         Plaintiffs allege that the Westinghouse defendants 
arbitrarily moved loans from nonearning to earning status just 
before mandated public reporting when, in fact, nothing had 
changed regarding the likelihood of collection.  Plaintiffs 
contend that they have pled specific facts permitting the 
inference that defendants were intentionally concealing loan 
losses.  We agree.  Plaintiffs are not merely challenging 
defendants' judgment regarding when collectibility became 
doubtful; instead, plaintiffs allege that defendants changed the 
classification of the loans when nothing regarding collectibility 
had occurred.  Plaintiffs allege that specific loans had at least 
three of the eight AICPA earmarks for nonearning status both 
before and after they were removed from nonearning status.  On a 
motion for summary judgment, defendants may be able to show why 
the status of these loans consistently changed just prior to the 
time of reporting, and they may be able to establish that no 
reasonable factfinder could find for plaintiffs.  At this stage, 
however, we cannot say that plaintiffs have failed to state a 
claim or have failed to plead fraud with sufficient 
particularity.  We therefore reverse this aspect of the district 
court's orders. 
         B.  Plaintiffs also allege that Westinghouse 
fraudulently overstated the quality of its internal controls, in 
violation of section 10(b).  Westinghouse indisputably made 
representations throughout the class period regarding the 
adequacy of its internal controls.  Plaintiffs essentially 
contend that those statements were made without a reasonable 
basis and with knowledge of or in reckless disregard of facts 
suggesting their falsity. 
         Plaintiffs' claim is based primarily on an internal 
report prepared following an anonymous tip alleging inadequate 
internal accounting controls.  After rejecting the assertions of 
the anonymous tip, the November 1990 report discussed 
recommendations for improving internal controls and addressing 
some overall concerns that the auditors had identified.  See App. 
939-53. 
         The district court found that "[t]he fact that the 
internal auditors also recommended improvements in valuation 
methods and tighter standards for internal valuations does not 
support plaintiffs' claim that in its Form 10K's Westinghouse 
fraudulently or even inaccurately represented its internal 
controls as adequate."  832 F. Supp. at 979; see alsoWestinghouse II, at 
8-9 ("plaintiffs' assertions amount to 
nothing more than `fraud by hindsight' allegations, based on the 
premise that the internal controls turned out to be 
inadequate.").  We agree that plaintiffs have failed to plead any 
facts supporting their conclusory allegation that Westinghouse 
fraudulently misrepresented the adequacy of its internal 
controls.  We therefore affirm dismissal of this aspect of the 
section 10(b) claim. 
         C.  Plaintiffs argue that the district court, by 
"compartmentalizing the evidence and wiping the slate clean after 
considering each component," failed to give weight to the 
"totality of the pleadings."  Plfs' Br. at 25.  We have 
instructed that the district courts should engage in precisely 
the sort of analysis undertaken by the district court in this 
case, see, e.g., UJB, 964 F.2d at 284; Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 
640, and we therefore find no merit in this argument. 
         In addition, plaintiffs' discussion of Rule 9(b) 
suggests that the district court improperly required them to 
plead defendants' state of mind with particularity.  See Plfs' 
Br. at 18-20 (relying on In re Glenfed, Inc. Securities 
Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).  We do not 
see any evidence of such a requirement in the district court's 
opinions, and we therefore find plaintiffs' legal argument 
irrelevant. 
         D.  Plaintiffs also appeal from dismissal of certain 
aspects of their section 10(b) claim against Price Waterhouse 
arising out of Price Waterhouse's 1988 and 1989 audits.  The 
district court granted Price Waterhouse's motion to dismiss in 
Westinghouse II based on plaintiffs' failure to plead any facts 
suggesting fraud on the part of Price Waterhouse with respect to 
the 1988 and 1989 audits.  Westinghouse II, at 21-30, App. 330- 
39.  The district court concluded that plaintiffs failed to state 
a fraud claim both with respect to whether Price Waterhouse 
fraudulently violated Generally Accepted Accounting Standards 
("GAAS") in its 1988 and 1989 audits and with respect to whether 
Price Waterhouse knew that Westinghouse's 1988 and 1989 financial 
statements failed to comply with GAAP and fraudulently stated 
otherwise.  The district court found that the only factual 
allegations contained in the second amended complaint relevant to 
plaintiffs' section 10(b) claims against Price Waterhouse related 
to the 1990 audit. 
         Although plaintiffs cite various GAAS standards, they 
nowhere explain how Price Waterhouse knowingly or recklessly 
violated those standards in performing its 1988 and 1989 audits.  
For example, plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege any facts 
supporting their conclusory allegation that Price Waterhouse 
failed to follow GAAS in determining whether Westinghouse's 2.5% 
loss reserves were reasonable in 1988 and 1989.  Moreover, as 
Price Waterhouse properly argues, plaintiffs do not allege that 
Price Waterhouse failed to consider the adequacy of 
Westinghouse's internal controls in planning the scope of or in 
executing the 1988 and 1989 audits; nor do plaintiffs allege that 
Price Waterhouse opined on the adequacy of Westinghouse's 
internal controls in those audits. 
         Plaintiffs' GAAP arguments are similarly unavailing.  
Under Christidis, plaintiffs must allege facts that give rise to 
an inference that Price Waterhouse knew or was reckless in not 
knowing that Westinghouse's financial statements failed to comply 
with GAAP.  717 F.2d at 100; see also Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 
F.2d 770, 776-78 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985).  
There are no facts cited in plaintiffs' second amended complaint 
supporting an inference that Price Waterhouse knew or was 
reckless in not knowing that Westinghouse was using speculative, 
inflated values in valuing receivables.  Moreover, although Price 
Waterhouse concedes that it knew that Westinghouse set its loss 
reserves at 2.5% of total assets in audit years 1988 and 1989, 
this fact provides no support for plaintiffs' allegation that 
Price Waterhouse knew that Westinghouse was violating GAAP in 
those years.  Assuming that Westinghouse violated GAAP during 
1988 and 1989, plaintiffs nonetheless fail to allege facts 
suggesting that Price Waterhouse intentionally or recklessly 
misrepresented Westinghouse's compliance with GAAP. 
         In short, plaintiffs fail to allege any facts 
supporting an inference that Price Waterhouse made fraudulent 
misrepresentations in its 1988 and 1989 audit opinions.  
Plaintiffs' allegations do not support an inference that Price 
Waterhouse could not reasonably and in good faith have opined 
that the financial statements as a whole fairly presented the 
financial condition of Westinghouse in accordance with GAAP.  We 
therefore affirm the district court's order dismissing the 
section 10(b) claims against Price Waterhouse arising out of 
Price Waterhouse's 1988 and 1989 audits. 
         E.  Plaintiffs also challenge the district court's 
dismissal of their section 10(b) claims against Lazard Freres 
("Lazard"), one of the underwriter defendants.  In addition to 
dismissing these claims under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine, 
the district court dismissed them on the ground that plaintiffs 
failed to plead any facts supporting section 10(b) liability 
against Lazard.  See Westinghouse I, 832 F. Supp. at 979-81; 
Westinghouse II, at 33-34, App. 342-43.  In Westinghouse I, the 
district court found that the documents upon which plaintiffs 
relied could not bear the construction placed on them by 
plaintiffs.  832 F. Supp. at 979-81; see also Westinghouse II, at 
33, App. 342.  We agree. 
         Plaintiffs place primary reliance on Lazard's December 
2, 1990, Progress Report and on a document entitled "Westinghouse 
Electric -- Board Meeting Q & A," developed for use at the 
February 27, 1991, Board meeting.  See App. 1428-41 (Progress 
Report); App. 1134-36 (Q & A).  Plaintiffs also rely on a report 
prepared by Westinghouse in September 1990.  See App. 918-36. 
         In the Progress Report, Lazard recommended "serious 
consideration of a comprehensive restructuring program which 
could include a one-time charge to earnings."  App. 1435.  Lazard 
also explained that "[t]he possible restructuring outlined 
earlier implies the ultimate disposition of roughly $3.2 billion 
or 55% of non-real estate assets and at least $1.5 billion of 
real estate (problem real estate totalled $1.5 billion or 37% of 
the portfolio at September 30, 1990)."  App. 1440 (emphasis in 
original).  In the proposed question and answer script, Lazard 
suggested the following response to the question, "Are the 
reserves adequate?":  "Given the results of each of these review 
processes, the charge taken today is clearly reasonable but was 
at the low end of the range identified by management in 
conjunction with the strategic review performed by Lazard."  App. 
1135. 
         Based on the above sources, plaintiffs argue that 
Lazard knew that the February 1991 charge was inadequate to 
protect against known and likely losses.  We agree with the 
district court, however, that the documents on which plaintiffs 
rely simply do not support their conclusory allegations and that 
plaintiffs fail to allege facts supporting their section 10(b) 
claims against Lazard.  These claims were properly dismissed in 
Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II. 
 
                                V. 
         Defendants argued in the district court that 
plaintiffs' allegations regarding loan loss reserves and non- 
earning loans in count I were subject to dismissal as being 
quantitatively immaterial as a matter of law (separate and apart 
from the "bespeaks caution" doctrine).  In Westinghouse I, the 
district court rejected defendants' argument, finding that the 
allegations of wrongfully understated reserves were sufficiently 
substantial when compared to Westinghouse's net income for the 
relevant time periods.  832 F. Supp. at 971-73.  In Westinghouse 
II, defendants argued that plaintiffs failed to allege a material 
misrepresentation or omission during the time period of March 28, 
1989, through March 28, 1990 (i.e., the first year of the class 
period) with respect to their allegations regarding the loan loss 
reserves and nonearning loans.  Westinghouse II, Op. at 13-18, 
App. 322-27.  The district court agreed and dismissed these 
claims for the first year of the class period.  Id. 
         Plaintiffs challenge this aspect of Westinghouse II, 
Plfs' Br. at 34-38, and defendants counter that all of the 
allegations regarding nonearning assets and loan loss reserves 
(not merely those for the first year of the class period) could 
and should have been dismissed on quantitative materiality 
grounds.  West. Br. at 39-45.  Assuming without deciding that 
defendants' latter argument (which was not raised on defendants' 
motion to dismiss the second amended complaint) is properly 
before us, we find it to be without merit.  We thus turn to the 
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for the first year of the class 
period. 
         As referred to earlier in our discussion of the 
"bespeaks caution" doctrine, "[a]n omitted fact is material if 
there is a `substantial likelihood that, under all the 
circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual 
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable 
shareholder.'"  UJB, 964 F.2d at 281 n.11 (quoting T.S.C. Indus., 
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).  "In other 
words, the issue is whether there is a substantial likelihood 
that the disclosure would have been viewed by the reasonable 
investor as having `significantly altered the "total mix" of 
information' available to that investor."  Id.  Moreover, 
"[m]ateriality is a mixed question of law and fact, and the 
delicate assessments of the inferences a reasonable shareholder 
would draw from a given set of facts are peculiarly for the trier 
of fact."  Id. (citing T.S.C., 426 U.S. at 450).  Therefore, 
"[o]nly if the alleged misrepresentations or omissions are so 
obviously unimportant to an investor that reasonable minds cannot 
differ on the question of materiality is it appropriate for the 
district court to rule that the allegations are inactionable as a 
matter of law."  Id. 
         The district court recognized that the adequacy of loan 
loss reserves is generally the type of information that would 
significantly influence a reasonable investor.  Westinghouse I, 
832 F. Supp. at 972 (citing UJB, 964 F.2d at 281).  However, the 
court also tested plaintiffs' complaint to determine whether the 
allegations regarding loan loss reserves were quantitatively 
material in this particular case.  The district court stated that 
"[t]he failure to disclose that a loan portfolio is likely to be 
impaired by some de minimis amount may be `relevant' in that it 
is the type of information that investors care about, but of such 
`dubious significance' as to be `trivial,' and `hardly conducive 
to informed decisionmaking,' so that to reasonable shareholders, 
such omission must be immaterial as a matter of law."  Id. at 972 
(quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 448-49).  We agree.  Seegenerally 
Loss & Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation137-41, 479-80 
(1995) (quantitative materiality analysis is 
generally appropriate, though not when "such matters as a 
conflict of interest or criminal violations are at issue"); seealso Ferber 
v. Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 698, 708 (D. Conn. 
1992) (omission of extent of second mortgages not material in 
relation to overall real estate, investment, and asset 
portfolios); In re First Chicago Corp. Securities Litigation, 769 
F. Supp. 1444, 1454 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (total value of alleged bad 
loan immaterial in relation to size of defendant's real estate 
loan portfolio). 
         Plaintiffs do not dispute that their only allegation 
challenging the adequacy of loan loss reserves prior to the 
fourth quarter of 1989 has to do with one asset that allegedly 
was improperly not written down by $1.278 million during the 
third quarter of that year.  See App. 1234.  The charge that 
would have followed the write-down of this asset would have 
amounted to merely 0.54% of Westinghouse's net income of $234 
million for that quarter.  We agree with the district court 
that this allegation is not sufficiently material to be 
actionable, i.e., there is not a substantial likelihood that this 
information would have assumed actual significance in the 
deliberations of a reasonable investor.  Plaintiffs thus allege 
no actionable reserves claims for the period prior to the fourth 
quarter of 1989.  The first actionable disclosures alleged in the 
second amended complaint relating to loan loss reserves for the 
fourth quarter of 1989 occurred on March 29, 1990.  The district 
court thus properly dismissed the reserves allegations that 
concern the period prior to the March 29, 1990, disclosures. 
         The district court also dismissed the nonearning loans 
allegations relating to the first year of the class period.  The 
court found that the assets identified in plaintiffs' complaint 
that allegedly should have been classified as nonearning through 
the fourth quarter of 1989 were barely 1% of Westinghouse's 
current assets for any quarter during that period and were thus 
immaterial.  The second amended complaint alleges that prior to 
the fourth quarter of 1989, eight assets were improperly not 
classified as nonearning assets.  See App. 1169-76.  These 
accounts amount to just 0.51% of Westinghouse's current assets 
for the first and second quarters of 1989 and only 1.2% of 
Westinghouse's current assets for the third quarter of 1989.  We 
again agree with the district court that these allegations are 
not sufficiently substantial to be material, and plaintiffs 
therefore allege no actionable nonearning loans claims for the 
period prior to the fourth quarter of 1989.  As with the 
reserves claims, the first actionable disclosures alleged in the 
second amended complaint relating to nonearning loans for the 
fourth quarter of 1989 occurred on March 29, 1990.  The district 
court thus properly dismissed the nonearning loans allegations 
that relate to the period prior to the March 29, 1990, 
disclosures. 
 
                               VI. 
         A.  As discussed above, the district court dismissed 
the section 12(2) claims under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.  
The district court also dismissed the section 12(2) claims on the 
ground that plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants "offered 
or sold" Westinghouse securities to plaintiffs within the meaning 
of section 12(2).  We turn now to plaintiffs' challenge to this 
determination. 
         Section 12(2) provides that a person who "offers or 
sells" newly issued securities by means of a prospectus or oral 
communication that misrepresents or omits material facts is 
liable to the person "purchasing such security from him."  15 
U.S.C.  77l(2).  In Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), the 
Supreme Court stated that although the language of section 12(1) 
"contemplates a buyer-seller relationship not unlike traditional 
contract privity," id. at 642, its scope is not limited only to 
those who pass title.  Id. at 642-47.  The Court held that the 
term "seller" in the context of section 12(1) includes (1) "the 
owner who passed title, or other interest in the security, to the 
buyer for value" and (2) "the person who successfully solicits 
the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his 
own financial interests or those of the securities owner."  Id.at 642, 
647.  Under Pinter, both direct sellers and those who 
engage in the active solicitation of an offer to buy can be 
"sellers" for purposes of section 12(1).  See id. at 646-47. 
         In In re Craftmatic Securities Litigation, 890 F.2d 628 
(3d Cir. 1989), we held that the Supreme Court's definition of 
the term "seller" under section 12(1) applies in actions brought 
under section 12(2).  Id. at 634-36; see also UJB, 964 F.2d at 
286-87.  Thus, under Pinter and our cases, a section 12(2) seller 
may be one who passes title to the buyer for value (a direct 
seller) or one "who successfully solicits the purchase, motivated 
at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests 
or those of the securities owner" (a solicitor seller).  Pinter, 
486 U.S. at 643. 
         In Craftmatic, we cautioned that "the language of  12, 
which makes a participant liable to the `person purchasing such a 
security from him . . .,' precludes actions against remote 
sellers, and focuses the inquiry on the relationship between the 
purchaser and the participant, rather than on the latter's degree 
of involvement in the transaction."  Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 636 
(citation omitted).  We added with regard to solicitation 
liability that "although an issuer is no longer immunized from  
12 liability, neither is an issuer liable solely on the basis of 
its involvement in preparing the prospectus.  The purchaser must 
demonstrate direct and active participation in the solicitation 
of the immediate sale to hold the issuer liable as a  12(2) 
seller."  Id. (citations omitted). 
         B.  Plaintiffs do not claim that any of the 
Westinghouse defendants were direct sellers.  Rather, plaintiffs 
allege that the underwriter defendants purchased the shares from 
Westinghouse and resold them to the public, including plaintiffs.  
E.g., App. 362-63, 366-67.  The Westinghouse defendants therefore 
cannot be liable under section 12(2) as direct sellers.  Cf. UJB, 
962 F.2d at 287 (plaintiffs not required to allege direct and 
active solicitation where newly offered shares were purchased 
directly through defendant UJB).  Plaintiffs further allege as 
follows: 
              593.  The section 12 Defendants were 
         sellers of Westinghouse securities within the 
         meaning of Section 12(2) of the Securities 
         Act and either sold or promoted the sale of 
         said securities directly to plaintiffs and 
         other Class members or solicited plaintiffs 
         and other Class members to buy such 
         securities.  In so acting, the Section 12 
         Defendants were motivated by a desire to 
         serve their own financial interests. 
App. 506 (count III); see also App. 511-12 (count V).  Plaintiffs 
allege no facts suggesting how any Westinghouse defendants 
directly and actively participated in the solicitation of 
plaintiffs' immediate purchases of Westinghouse stock. 
         The district court dismissed the section 12(2) claims, 
explaining as follows: 
         [P]laintiffs have not alleged that the 
         Westinghouse defendants in fact sold or 
         solicited the purchase of Westinghouse 
         securities, but attempt nonetheless to 
         analogize their allegations to the 
         allegations and holding in Craftmatic by 
         pointing to the similarity of language 
         employed. . . .  The conclusory allegation 
         that defendants sold or solicited the 
         purchase of securities will withstand a 
         motion to dismiss only if accompanied by 
         allegations of fact that defendants did sell 
         or solicit the purchase of securities. 
Westinghouse I, 832 F. Supp. at 984 (citation and footnote 
omitted) (emphasis in original).  Plaintiffs argue that because 
the facts alleged in their complaint are so similar to the 
factual allegations of the complaint sustained in Craftmatic, 
they stated a section 12(2) claim.  See Plfs' Br. at 40-41.  We 
are constrained to agree. 
         It is certainly true that plaintiffs' section 12(2) 
allegations are not clearly drafted.  Plaintiffs do not, for 
example, make clear which defendants are alleged to be direct 
sellers as opposed to solicitor sellers.  See UJB, 964 F.2d at 
287 n.17.  Nor do plaintiffs allege how the Westinghouse 
defendants, assuming they are alleged to be solicitor sellers, 
directly and actively participated in the solicitation of the 
immediate sales.  Further, plaintiffs' allegation that 
defendants "promoted the sale of" securities would not, standing 
alone, give rise to any section 12(2) liability.  The district 
court could certainly require that plaintiffs clear up these 
ambiguities on remand. 
         Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, 
however, the complaint does allege that the Westinghouse 
defendants "solicited plaintiffs" to purchase Westinghouse 
securities and that in so doing they were motivated by a desire 
to serve their own financial interests.  Contrary to the district 
court's statement, these are factual allegations -- allegations 
plaintiffs will have to prove -- and not bare legal conclusions.  
Under Craftmatic, plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6):  "It cannot be 
said at this juncture that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts 
that would entitle them to relief."  Craftmatic, 890 F.2d at 637 
(citations omitted).  For these reasons, we reverse the district 
court's order dismissing the section 12(2) claims against the 
Westinghouse defendants. 
         We note that although fraud is not a necessary element 
of a claim under section 12(2), section 12(2) claims that do 
sound in fraud must be pled with particularity.  UJB, 964 F.2d at 
288-89.  The district court did not decide, nor do defendants 
argue, that plaintiffs' section 12(2) claims sound in fraud.  
To the extent, if any, that the section 12(2) claims in fact 
sound in fraud, plaintiffs could justifiably be required to plead 
the circumstances constituting fraud with the particularity 
required by Rule 9(b).  This is not, however, the theory on 
which the district court rested its decision; nor has it been 
advanced by the parties in this court. 
         C.  As to the underwriter defendants, the first amended 
complaint alleges that "[e]ach member of the Underwriter Class 
sold Westinghouse stock to members of the Prospectus Subclass 
during the Class Period."  App. 367.  Plaintiffs further allege 
that the underwriter defendants sold Westinghouse securities 
"directly to plaintiffs and other Class members."  App. 506. 
         The district court dismissed the section 12(2) claims 
against the underwriter defendants, finding that plaintiffs 
failed to allege that the underwriter defendants were statutory 
sellers under section 12(2).  The district court explained as 
follows: 
              In Count Three, plaintiffs must allege, 
         to state a viable Section 12(2) cause of 
         action, that the underwriter defendants were 
         "sellers" within the meaning of Section 
         12(2).  That is, there must be an allegation 
         that a particular proposed defendant sold or 
         solicited the sale of Westinghouse securities 
         to the individual plaintiffs.  Pinter v. 
         Dahl, 486 U.S. at 643-47.  This element is 
         lacking. 
Westinghouse I, 832 F. Supp. at 987. 
         We agree with the district court that plaintiffs must 
allege that the underwriter defendants were section 12(2) 
sellers, but we do not find support in Pinter for the district 
court's statement that, in order to achieve this, plaintiffs are 
required to allege which underwriter sold securities to each 
plaintiff.  Under Pinter, a plaintiff will not succeed on a 
section 12(2) claim unless the plaintiff shows, among other 
things, that the plaintiff bought from or was solicited by a 
specified statutory seller.  But Pinter does not address what 
allegations are necessary to plead that a defendant is a seller 
within the meaning of the statute.  Absent a particularity 
requirement, plaintiffs must provide a short and plain 
statement showing that the underwriter defendants are statutory 
sellers and that plaintiffs purchased securities from them. 
         We find that plaintiffs satisfied this requirement and 
stated a section 12(2) claim against the underwriter defendants.  
Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the first 
amended complaint alleges that each of the underwriter defendants 
sold Westinghouse securities directly to plaintiffs and that each 
plaintiff purchased Westinghouse securities directly from an 
underwriter defendant.  Cf. Jackson v. First Federal Savings of 
Arkansas, 709 F. Supp. 863, 884 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (dismissing 
section 12(2) claim where plaintiff did not allege that any 
defendant sold him his shares or solicited him to buy his 
shares).  The defendants and the district court have not pointed 
to any authority requiring anything further.  Although plaintiffs 
did not submit a model pleading, we cannot say they failed to 
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  Compare Craftmatic, 890 
F.2d at 637; see also Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 
F.2d 531, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1989) ("While this is not a model form 
of pleading a section 12(2) claim, it satisfies the short and 
plain statement rule of Rule 8(a)(2) which provides that a 
pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain `a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief.'") (citation omitted); In re Chambers 
Development Securities Litigation, 848 F. Supp. 602, 625 (W.D. 
Pa. 1994) (sustaining section 12(2) allegations not unlike those 
in this case); Miller v. New America High Income Fund, 755 F. 
Supp. 1099, 1105 (D. Mass. 1991) ("Applying the appropriate 
standard of scrutiny for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a set of facts 
establishing the underwriter defendants as `sellers' is clearly 
plausible, although the plaintiffs must later produce facts to 
prove the underwriter defendants' actual participation in the 
activity.") (citation omitted), aff'd, 36 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 
1994).  We therefore reverse the district court's order 
dismissing the section 12(2) claims against the underwriter 
defendants. 
 
                               VII. 
         After defendants filed the motions to dismiss that led 
to Westinghouse II, plaintiffs cross-moved to supplement the 
second amended complaint.  See App. 1582-83.  Plaintiffs sought 
to add an additional alleged misrepresentation -- Lego's alleged 
October 1990 statement that Westinghouse had only an immaterial 
amount of restructured receivables. 
         Plaintiffs' motion is not discussed at any length in 
Westinghouse II.  It is addressed in one sentence of the opinion 
and one sentence of the order.  See Westinghouse II, Op. at 21, 
App. 330 (dismissing second amended complaint under rule 8; 
granting plaintiffs 30 days within which to replead surviving 
claims in compliance with rule 8; and denying as moot the cross- 
motion to supplement); Westinghouse II, Order at 35, App. 344 
("Plaintiffs' cross-motion to supplement the Second Amended 
Complaint (Docket No. 174) is denied as moot.").  In their brief 
on appeal, plaintiffs state that "[t]he only possible basis for 
the finding of mootness was the blanket dismissal of the Second 
Complaint under Rule 8."  Plaintiffs' Br. at 47.  It seems to us 
that this is in fact why the district judge dismissed the motion 
as moot -- because plaintiffs were presumably going to be 
submitting a third amended complaint and would include the newly- 
discovered allegation in that complaint.  
         We find no abuse of discretion in this ruling.  The 
plaintiffs could have included (and were expected to include) the 
allegation at issue in the third amended complaint.  They chose 
not to submit that complaint.  The allegation at issue is 
relevant to claims that survived the district court's orders in 
Westinghouse I and Westinghouse II, claims that were dismissed 
with prejudice under Rule 8 only after plaintiffs' decision to 
stand on the second amended complaint.  Plaintiffs therefore 
abandoned this allegation when they chose not to submit a third 
amended complaint.   
 
                              VIII. 
         Plaintiffs argue that on remand this case should be 
reassigned to a new district court judge.  Plaintiffs rely 
primarily upon the following statement from Westinghouse I: 
         In the early 1980's, WCC hit its stride when 
         it tapped into the booming commercial and 
         residential real estate markets. 
               
              Such success, however, was short-lived.  
         WCC's fortunes collapsed along with the real 
         estate market in the late-1980's, and the 
         price of Westinghouse stock tumbled during 
         the class period from a high of $39.75/share 
         to a low of $15.875/share.  Now, like so many 
         lending institutions battered by the late- 
         1980's real estate bust, Westinghouse, along 
         with its outside accountant and investment 
         bankers, is defending against shareholders 
         who allege that the company made false and 
         misleading statements regarding the health of 
         its financial services units, thereby 
         artificially inflating the price of 
         Westinghouse stock and damaging plaintiffs 
         who purchased that stock at what they claim 
         to have been an artificially high price. 
Westinghouse I, 832 F. Supp. at 958 (citations omitted). 
         According to plaintiffs, "[t]his statement suggests 
that plaintiffs' claims have no merit and that their damages were 
caused not by defendants' fraud, but by an economic environment 
visited on defendants."  Plfs' Br. at 48.  Plaintiffs argue that 
although it was proper for the judge to take judicial notice of 
the downturn in the real estate market, "it was improper for [the 
judge] to attribute plaintiffs' extensive damages to this trend 
rather than to defendants' fraudulent scheme as alleged in the 
Complaints."  Plfs' Rep. Br. at 24.  Plaintiffs seem to us to 
read too much into the judge's statement, and we note that the 
district judge's comment was not unlike others found in other 
reported decisions.  See, e.g., UJB, 964 F.2d at 274 ("This case 
is one of a number of federal securities actions against 
financially troubled banking institutions.  After a sharp 
downturn in the financial condition of defendant UJB Financial 
Corporation, its shareholders filed a complaint[.]"); see alsoSerabian v. 
Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc., 24 F.3d 357, 360 (1st 
Cir. 1994) ("The complaint depicts an increasingly familiar saga 
of a bank that boomed with the real estate market of the early 
1980s, but suffered in the recession and deteriorating market 
that followed.")  (citations omitted). 
         As in United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1412 (3d 
Cir. 1994), plaintiffs here make "no allegation that [the 
district judge] derived his bias from an extrajudicial source."  
Rather, all the incidents cited involve rulings and statements 
made in deciding motions.  "Thus, these incidents will not 
support recusal unless, looked at objectively, `they display a 
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair 
judgment impossible.'"  Id. (quoting Liteky v. United States, 114 
S. Ct. 1147, 1157 (1994)).  Plaintiffs have not identified 
anything suggesting such a favoritism or antagonism, and our 
review of the record reveals none.  Finally, we note that, as a 
practical matter, the judge sustained a number of the section 
10(b) claims asserted in count I in both Westinghouse I and 
Westinghouse II.  For these reasons, we reject all of plaintiffs' 
contentions raised in support of their reassignment argument.  We 
wish to emphasize that requesting reassignment is a grave step; 
it should not be taken lightly or for the purpose of seeking some 
strategic advantage. 
 
                               IX. 
         For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and 
reverse in part the district court's orders entered on July 29, 
1993 (Westinghouse I), January 23, 1995 (Westinghouse II), and 
March 1, 1995 (Memorandum Order dated 2/28/95), and we remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                     
 
 
